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Abstract
Privacy has become a major concern in Online Social Networks (OSNs) due to threats such
as advertising spam, online stalking and identity theft. Although many users hide or do not
fill out their private attributes in OSNs, prior studies point out that the hidden attributes
may be inferred from some other public information. Thus, users’ private information could
still be at stake to be exposed. Hitherto, little work helps users to assess the exposure
probability/risk that the hidden attributes can be correctly predicted, let alone provides
them with pointed countermeasures. In this article, we focus our study on the exposure
risk assessment by a particular privacy-sensitive attribute - current city - in Facebook.
Specifically, we first design a novel current city prediction approach that discloses users’
hidden ‘current city’ from their self-exposed information. Based on 371, 913 Facebook users’
data, we verify that our proposed prediction approach can predict users’ current city more
accurately than state-of-the-art approaches. Furthermore, we inspect the prediction results
and model the current city exposure probability via some measurable characteristics of the
self-exposed information. Finally, we construct an exposure estimator to assess the current
city exposure risk for individual users, given their self-exposed information. Several case
studies are presented to illustrate how to use our proposed estimator for privacy protection.
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1. Introduction
During the last decade, Online Social Networks (OSNs) have successfully attracted bil-
lions of people who share a huge amount of personal information through the Internet, such
as their background, preferences and social connections. Owing to the increase of potential
violations such as advertising spam, online stalking and identity theft [15], in recent years,
more and more users have concerns about their privacy in OSNs and become reluctant to
publish all their personal information [10]. Consequently, users may not fill out their privacy-
sensitive attributes (e.g., location, age, or phone number), or they hide this information from
strangers and only allow their friends to view such information [7].
While hiding the privacy-sensitive attributes, users usually expose some other informa-
tion that appears to be less sensitive to them. It has been reported that Facebook users
publicly reveal four attributes on average, and 63% of them uncover their friends list [13].
Due to the correlations among various attributes, some of the self-exposed information
may indicate the invisible privacy-sensitive attributes to some extent [6][29]. Hence, it is
questionable whether the privacy-sensitive attributes that a user intends to hide are really
hidden.
This work, using location information as a representative case, aims to assess what is
the risk that a user’s invisible information could be disclosed. There are several reasons
that lead us to conduct this study based on location information. First, among various
kinds of information, location is usually one of the privacy-sensitive attributes for most
users [4]. In real-life OSNs, we notice that users are quite careful to not reveal their location
information: 16% of users in Twitter reveal home city [23] and 0.6% of Facebook users
publish home address [3]. Second, location information is a commercially valuable attribute
which might even be misused by unscrupulous businesses to bombard a user with unsolicited
marketing [12]. In addition, location information leakage may lead to a spectrum of intrusive
inferences such as inferring a user’s political view or personal preference [12][17]. Therefore,
(Leye Wang), jtwen@tsinghua.edu.cn (Jiangtao Wen), acrumin@it.uc3m.es (A´ngel Cuevas),
cschaochen@cqu.edu.cn (Chao Chen), noel.crespi@telecom-sudparis.eu (Noel Crespi)
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protecting the hidden location information for a user becomes rather critical. In particular,
as Facebook is the most popular OSN [35], we concentrate on the attribute of current city
in Facebook and investigate the following issues:
1) Is the private current city that a user expects to hide really hidden? In other words,
if a user hides his current city but exposes some other information, can we predict a user’s
current city by using his self-exposed information?
2) Can we help individual users to understand the actual risk (probability) that their
private current city could be correctly predicted based on their self-exposed information?
Furthermore, can we provide some countermeasures to increase the security of the hidden
current city?
To address these issues, we first propose a current city prediction approach to predict
users’ hidden current city. Although many location prediction approaches have been de-
veloped for Twitter [5][8][21][32] and Foursquare [29][30], they cannot be appropriately
implemented on Facebook because of the different properties (e.g., obtainable information)
in these OSNs. For Facebook, Backstrom et al. predict users’ locations based on their
friends’ locations [3]. In addition to friends’ locations, users’ profile attributes, such as
hometown, school and workplace, may also indicate their current city to some extent [6]. In
order to achieve high prediction accuracy in Facebook, we devise a novel current city pre-
diction approach by extracting location indications from integrated self-exposed information
including profile attributes and friends list.
Second, based on the proposed prediction approach, we construct a current city exposure
estimator to estimate the exposure probability that a user’s invisible current city may be
correctly inferred via his self-exposed information. The exposure estimator can also provide
a user with some countermeasures to keep his hidden current city hidden. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work that estimates the exposure probability of a user’s invisible
attribute by his self-exposed information.
It is a non-trivial task to construct either the current city prediction approach or the
exposure estimator. We encounter the following challenges:
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1) How to extract and integrate different location indications from a user’s
multiple self-exposed information? Since the proposed prediction approach explores
location indications from both profile attributes and friends list, two subproblems are con-
sidered. (i) A user probably reveals multiple attributes (e.g., hometown, workplace) which
may indicate different locations; besides, a certain attribute might indicate several locations.
For example, a user working in Google suggests that the user could probably live in any
city where Google sets up an office, e.g., California, Beijing or Paris. (ii) The friends
of a user, probably residing in different cities, may be close to or far away from the user.
These strong or weak geographic relations may influence the significance of the friends’ lo-
cation indications. Thus, it is challenging to appropriately combine these various location
indications into an integrated model, so as to determine the probabilities of locations where
the user may live.
2) How to predict a user’s current city when we obtain the probabilities of
the user being at various locations? By overcoming challenge 1, we can obtain a
probability vector which indicates the probabilities that a user resides at certain locations.
With this probability vector, a straight-forward prediction approach could select the location
with the highest probability as the user’s current city. However, this might not be the best
option when concerning the locations’ geographic relations. Assume the probability vector
suggests that a user u has 40%, 35% and 25% probability of residing in Beijing, Paris
and Evry respectively. Then, u is more likely to live in the area around Paris and Evry
than Beijing, because Paris and Evry are only 30km apart but they are thousands of
kilometers away from Beijing. Hence, a location selection method should be carefully
designed for a current city prediction approach.
3)How to estimate the exposure risk of a user’s hidden current city? To help
a user understand the exposure risk of his hidden current city, a straight-forward method
would be to provide a predicted location; thus the user can decide whether his current city
can be predicted correctly (risky) or incorrectly (secure). However, this method may not
meet users’ expectations. A user, whose location is correctly predicted, may expect being
able to know which of his self-exposed information primarily leads to the leakage of his
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private current city and how to increase its security. A user, whose hidden location is not
predicted correctly, still needs to be aware of some leakage of location that may exist. For
example, a prediction approach may incorrectly infer a Parisian living in Lyon according
to probabilistic results: 55% in Lyon and 45% in Paris; Even though the prediction result
is incorrect, the user still leaks some location information. Therefore, how to estimate the
current city exposure risk and help a user achieve his desired privacy level is a challenging
objective.
This paper makes the following contributions:
1) Profile and friend location indication model: To properly extract location indi-
cations from users’ self-exposed information, we construct an integrated probability model.
We capture location indications from two types of information: location sensitive attributes
and friends list. Location sensitive attributes are the profile attributes that can indicate
one or multiple locations. In this paper, we use ‘Hometown’ and ‘Work and Education’ as
the location sensitive attributes. For each location sensitive attribute, we set up a location
attribute indication matrix from which we can index the locations and the corresponding
probabilities that a certain attribute value indicates. Besides, considering a user and each of
his friends who publish current city, we estimate their location similarity according to their
attribute correlations, and assign a large weight to a friend that has a high location similarity
to the user. For a friend who does not reveal current city, we predict the friend’s current city
using his visible location sensitive attributes, and assign him a very small weight. Finally,
based on information from 371, 913 users collected from Facebook, we train an integrated
model that can determine the probability for each potential city where a user may reside.
2)Current city prediction approach: To address Challenge 2, we aggregate locations
into clusters by considering the locations’ geographic relations. Then, based on the proposed
profile and friend location indication model, we predict a user’s invisible current city in two
steps: (i) cluster-selection: for each cluster, we sum up the probabilities of locations inside
the cluster; then we select the cluster with the highest probability; (ii) location-selection:
we determine a best location within the selected cluster as the user’s current city. The
evaluation results demonstrate that our proposed prediction approach achieves lower error
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distance and higher accuracy than the state-of-the-art approaches. Furthermore, for the
users who reveal their ‘Hometown’ and ‘Work and Education’, our proposed approach can
predict current city with an accuracy of 90%.
3) Current city exposure estimator: We define some measurements to describe the
characteristics of users’ self-exposed information. Based on these measurements, we analyze
how the users’ self-exposed information affects the probability that their current city may be
correctly inferred (i.e., current city exposure probability). Furthermore, Random Decision
Forest method is employed to model the current city exposure probability, and subsequently
a current city exposure estimator is constructed. Given a user’s self-exposed information,
the proposed exposure estimator provides two estimators — Exposure Probability and Risk
Level — to quantify the current city exposure risk. The exposure estimator can also esti-
mate the exposure risk assuming that the user hides some of his self-exposed information.
Consequently, the user can easily decide which information he should hide to satisfy his
privacy intention.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We review the literature in Sec. 2, formulate
the current city prediction problem in Sec. 3, and overview our solution to the prediction
problem in Sec. 4. Next, the profile and friend location indication model is devised in
Sec. 5; the current city prediction approach is respectively presented and evaluated in Sec. 6
and Sec. 7. By inspecting the current city prediction results, Sec. 8 proposes the exposure
estimator. Finally, Sec.9 makes some discussions and points out future work. Sec. 10
concludes this work.
2. Literature Review
In this section, we briefly review the related work from two perspectives: city-level
location prediction and privacy in OSNs.
2.1. City-Level Location Prediction
Existing city-level location prediction approaches can be classified into four categories:
relationship-based prediction, content-based prediction, hybrid content-relationship predic-
6
tion and multi-indication prediction.
2.1.1. Relationship-based Prediction
Based on the principle that the probability of being friends is declining with geographic
distance, this prediction category infers a user’s location according to the visible locations
of his friends [3]. Researchers have studied the correlation between geographic distance and
social relationship on large-scale Facebook users in United States. They reveal that the
probability of being friends falls down monotonically as the distance increases. Depending
on this observation, they build a maximum-likelihood location prediction model and finally
refine the prediction with an iterative algorithm.
2.1.2. Content-based Prediction
The rise of Twitter has spawned a mass of tweets. As some tweets contain location-
specific data, this category of prediction approaches [5][8][21] infers a user’s location relying
on his location-related tweets. The basic idea of these approaches is to detect the location-
related tweets and construct a probabilistic model to estimate the distribution of location-
related words used in tweets. In order to raise the prediction accuracy, the basic idea is
improved by various means, such as such as selecting the top K probable cities [5], identi-
fying words with a strong local geo-scope and refining the prediction with a neighborhood
smoothing model [8].
2.1.3. Hybrid Content-Relationship Prediction
Another compelling category combines the location indications from relationships and
tweet content. TweetHood identifies a user’s location by exploring both his tweets and his
closest friends’ locations [1]. Tweecalization improves TweetHood by employing a semi-
supervised learning algorithm and introducing a new measurement which combines trust-
worthiness and the number of common friends to weight friends [2]. Li et al. integrate the
location influences captured from both social network and user-centric tweets into a unified
discriminative probabilistic model [24]. By considering a user who may be related to mul-
tiple locations, MLP model [23] proposes to set up a complete ‘location profiles’ prediction
7
which infers not only a user’s home location but also his other related locations.
2.1.4. Multi-Indication Prediction
Besides users’ relationships and content, multi-indication prediction approaches explore
multiple location indications from other possible location resources to infer users’ invisible
location. To resolve ambiguous toponymies in tweet content, besides location indications
extracted from tweets, existing work has introduced location indications from websites’
country code, geocoded IP addresses, time zone and UTC24-offset [33]. Such a multi-
indication idea has also been used to Foursquare, which specifically exploits mayorships, tips
and dones that users marked [30]. However, all these multi-indication prediction approaches
are proposed for either Twitter or Foursquare, but not for Facebook. Our previous work
reveals the statistical analyzed correlation between users’ current city and other location
sensitive attributes in Facebook [6]. It also predicts a user’s current city with city-level
and country-level results by using a neural network approach. However, this previous work
assumed that an attribute value could map to a specific location, which is not true for many
cases. Recall the example that a user works in Google might work in California, Paris
or Beijing (Challenge 1 of Sec. 1).
In this paper, we consider multiple location indications by integrating relationship and
profile attributes in Facebook. Compared to our previous work where an attribute value
only allows to bind with one fixed location [6], an attribute value can be mapped to multiple
locations with different probabilities in the newly proposed model. In addition, we consider
both the friends whose current city is either visible or invisible; whereas the existing work
relies on the friends who reveal their locations [3][24]. Particularly, we propose a new
approach to bias the weights of friends whose current city is visible.
2.2. Privacy in OSNs
In OSNs, users are more and more concerned with privacy of their personal informa-
tion [10]. A majority of users configure their privacy settings and hide some of their in-
formation from strangers. Unfortunately, previous research has pointed out the disparity
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between the expectation and the reality of users’ privacy; and it has also showed that much
of users’ private information is easily uncovered [27].
Much existing work ascribes the privacy leakage to the users themselves. On one hand,
users might incorrectly manage their privacy settings due to the poor human-computer
interaction or complex privacy maintainability [27][4]. To address this issue, researchers have
designed a user-friendly interface for managing privacy settings with an audience view [26].
On the other hand, users only hide some of the attributes that are privacy-sensitive to
them while make the others accessible to public — users on Facebook generally expose more
than four attributes to strangers and 63% of users share their friend lists with the public [13].
As reported, such user self-exposure behavior leaves a huge chance for inferring the hidden
attributes [11][28][20]. Many tools have been developed to infer users’ invisible information
by various means such as inferring the private information through users’ other self-exposed
information [28], their social connections [11][20] and social groups [40][22].
Some papers claim that it is hard for a user to avoid privacy leakages if he only hides
the private attribute [11][28][36]; whereas many studies merely suggest users with a general
idea of hiding other attributes so as to become more secure (e.g., hide relationships [19]).
Unlike the above work, we provide an individual user with the exposure probability of his
private current city concerning his self-exposed information. We also suggest some pointed
rules for protecting users’ privacy on their current city.
3. Formulation of Current City Prediction Problem
In this section, we formulate the current city prediction problem. Facebook, as a so-
cial network containing location information, can be viewed as an undirected graph G =
(U , E ,L), where U is a set of users; E is a set of edges e〈u, v〉 representing the friend rela-
tionship between users u and v, where u and v ∈ U ; L is a candidate locations list composed
of all the user-generated locations.
Typically, a user u in Facebook might contribute various items of information, e.g., basic
profile information, friends, comments and photos. The core information of u in this paper
is the user’s current city, denoted as l(u). The users are classified into two sets according to
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the accessibility of users’ current city: current city available users (LA-users) and current
city unavailable users (LN-users). We, respectively, use U
LA
and U
LN
to denote the sets of
LA-users and LN-users, where U = U
LA
∪ U
LN
.
To predict users’ current city, we exploit the users’ location sensitive attributes and
friends list. Assume that there exist m types of location sensitive attributes, denoted as
A = {a1, a2, · · · , am}. Specifically, we denote a user u’s location sensitive attributes as
A(u) = {a1(u), a2(u), · · · , am(u)}. The users may also have a friends list, denoted as F(u),
where F(u) = {f ∈ U : e〈u, f〉 ∈ E}. Therefore, we use a tuple to represent a user as
u : 〈l(u),A(u),F(u)〉.
Additionally, each location is associated with a unified ID (lid). Then, with this ID,
we can obtain each location’s latitude and longitude coordinate via Facebook Graph API
Explorer. Therefore, a location can also be written as a tuple: l : 〈lid, lat, lon〉 and the
candidate locations list can be denoted as a set of location tuples: L = {l : 〈lid, lat, lon〉}N ,
where lat and lon respectively stand for the latitude and longitude of a location, and N is
the number of candidate locations in the list.
Thus, the current city prediction problem can be formally stated as: Given, (i) a
graph G = (U
LA
∪ U
LN
, E ,L); (ii) the public location l(u) for LA-users u ∈ U
LA
; (iii) the
location sensitive attributes A(u) and the friends list F(u) for all the users u ∈ (U
LA
∪U
LN
),
we predict current city lˆ(u) for each LN-user u ∈ U
LN
, so as to make lˆ(u) close to the user’s
real current city.
Note that the current city of a user’s friends can be either available (f ∈ U
LA
) or
unavailable (f ∈ U
LN
). Thus, we introduce two notations to represent the two groups
of friends: current city available friends (LA-friends) and current city unavailable friends
(LN-friends). Let denote a user’s LA-friends as F
LA
(u) and LN-friends as F
LN
(u), where
F(u) = F
LA
(u) ∪ F
LN
(u).
4. Overview of Current City Prediction
The goal of current city prediction is to correctly infer a coordinate point with latitude
and longitude for a LN-user, given the candidate locations list L and the user’s self-exposed
10
information including his location sensitive attributes and friends list. Figure 1 illustrates
the framework of the proposed current city prediction solution. To determine the current
city of a LN-user, we first train an integrated profile and friend location indication (i.e.,
PFLI ) model to compute the probabilities of the candidate locations in which the LN-user
may currently live. Next we take a two-step location selection strategy: cluster selection
and location selection. Specifically, we aggregate the nearby locations into a location cluster
and obtain a set of location clusters. We then calculate the probability of a user being in
a cluster by summing up the probabilities of all the candidate locations belonging to this
cluster; the cluster with the highest probability is picked out as a candidate cluster. Finally,
we try to select the ‘best’ location from the candidate cluster as the predicted current city.
Clustering 
Locations
Cluster Selector
Profile & Friend Location 
Indication (PFLI) Model
Probability 
@Locations
Predicted Current City
Friends
Location Selector
Profile
Clusters
Candidate 
Locations
Profile & Friend Location 
Indication (PFLI) Model
FLI Model
PLI 
Model
Current City Pre
LN-User
Figure 1: Framework of Current City Prediction.
To train the integrated PFLI model (see the right-hand part of Figure 1), we separately
consider the location indications from location sensitive attributes and friends, and conse-
quently obtain two sub-models: profile location indication (PLI ) model and friend location
indication (FLI ) model. Both PLI model and FLI model calculate a probability vector in
which the element stands for the probability of a user being at a certain candidate location.
Note that, FLI model leverages the location indications from both LA-friends and LN-
friends. By integrating the probability vectors that are generated by PLI and FLI models
with appropriate parameters, a unified profile and friend location indication (PFLI ) model
is derived.
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Next, we will elaborate the PFLI model and the current city prediction approach.
5. Profile and Friend Location Indication Model
In this section, we describe the design of the probabilistic models that can suggest the
probabilities of users being at each of the candidate locations. We first introduce the profile
location indication (PLI ) model; it estimates the probability of each candidate location by
merely relying on a user’s location sensitive attributes. Then, we describe the friend loca-
tion indication (FLI ) model, which captures the location indications from a user’s friends.
Finally, we integrate these two models and obtain the integrated profile and friend location
indication (PFLI ) model.
5.1. Profile Location Indication Model
According to Challenge 1 in Sec. 1, two problems should be considered in constructing
PLI model. First, a certain value of a location sensitive attribute may indicate several
locations. For instance, Google, being a certain value of workplace, could indicate any
city where Google sets up an office such as California, Beijing or Paris. Therefore,
for each attribute value, we consider all possible location indications with the corresponding
probabilities. Second, a user may present multiple location sensitive attributes (e.g., home-
town, workplace, college). Thus we integrate various location indications extracted from
different location sensitive attributes.
To capture the multiple possible location indications from one attribute value, we define
a location-attribute indication matrix for each (k-th) location sensitive attribute ak ∈ A,
denoted as Rk. The rows of this matrix represent the candidate locations (l ∈ L), while
the columns stand for the possible values of ak. We use li to represent the i-th candidate
location and akj to denote the j-th possible value of ak. A cell σ
ij
k in the matrix calculates
the indication probability of akj to li — the probability that a user, whose k-th location
sensitive attribute ak equals akj , currently lives in the city li. Specifically, the indication
probability equals the number of users who live in li and have a value of akj divided by the
total number of users who have a value of akj . For instance, considering workplace, if 10 out
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of 100 employees from Telecom SudParis in the whole data set state that they live in
Evry, then the indication probability of Telecom SudParis to Evry is 0.1. Note that,
the j-th column of Rk represents the multiple location indications of akj .
Assume that ak hasM possible values except null ; N is the total number of the candidate
locations. The k-th location-attribute indication matrix can be written as:
Rk = {σ
ij
k }N×M = {p(l(u) = li|ak(u) = akj )}N×M = [R·k1, R·k2, ..., R·kM ]
where R·kj represents all the locations’ probabilities for a user who presents akj .
Based on the location-attribute indication matrix (R), we model the probability of a
user’s current city at li by combining all of a user’s available location sensitive attributes in
his profile:
p
Prof
(u, li) =
∑
ak∈A,ak(u)6=null
αkp(l(u) = li|ak(u) = akj)
=
∑
ak∈A,ak(u)6=null
αkσk(u, li)
(1)
where σk(u, li) can be easily obtained by indexing the corresponding location-attribute in-
dication matrix (Rk) according to u’s value of ak (ak(u) = akj ) and the given location (li),
namely σijk ; αk is a parameter to adjust the significance of the different location sensitive
attributes.
As we discussed in Sec. 3, a user may not reveal some attributes. Therefore, in Eq.
1, the location indication from the attribute ak(u) at any location equals zero if the user’s
ak(u) is invisible. If all of a user’s location sensitive attributes are invisible, we rely on his
friends’ information to infer his current city, which we will discuss in the next section.
5.2. Friend Location Indication Model
In addition to a user’s location sensitive attributes, we explore location indications from
users’ friends to construct FLI model. A user’s friends can be either LA-friends (current
city available) or LN-friends (current city unavailable). We build up FLI model primarily
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depending on LA-friends’ location indications and also considering LN-friends’ location indi-
cations as a small regulator. Accordingly, FLI model contains two components: LA-friends
location indication (LA-FLI ) model and LN-friends location indication (LN-FLI ) model.
5.2.1. LA-FLI Model
LA-FLI model differentiates the weights of a user’s LA-friends and estimates his proba-
bility of living in location li by the weights of his friends who also live in li. LA-FLI model
expects to assign high weights to the LA-friends who live in the same city as the user does.
However, since the user’s city is unknown, whether or not a friend and the user live in the
same city cannot be directly determined. Therefore, LA-FLI model assesses the likelihood
that two users live in a same city (i.e., location similarity) based on the correlation between
their location sensitive attributes. Figure 2 illustrates an example to show that the location
Work: Baidu
Current City: <Beijing,CN,39.9,16.4 >
Hometown: <ZJJ,CN,29.3,110.5>
U2
U5
LA-userU
U1
U4
LN-userU
U3
Work: ?
Current City: ? 
Hometown: <ZJJ,CN ,29.3,110.5>
Work: Telecom SudPairs
Current City: <PARIS,FR,48.9,2.4>
Hometown: < PARIS,FR,48.9,2.4>
Work: Telecom SudPairs
Current City: < EVRY,FR,48.6,2.5 >
Hometown: <PARIS,48.9,2.4>
Work: Telecom SudPairs
Current City: ? 
Hometown: ?
Figure 2: An Example of Social Relations and Profile Information.
sensitive attributes can be used to distinguish the weights among various LA-friends. Focus-
ing on LN-user u2 and his LA-friends u3, u4 and u5, we notice that u2 and u3, u4 work in the
same institute, while u5 works in another company which is far away from u2’s workplace.
In this case, it is natural to infer that u2 is more likely to be living in the same city with u3
and u4 than with u5; then u3 and u4 should be assigned with higher weights than u5 because
of the location similarity indicated by their workplace.
Inspired by the example, we construct an attribute-based location similarity matrix (Wk)
by each (k-th) location sensitive attribute (ak ∈ A). In the matrix, a cell w
ij
k calculates
the probability that two users live in the same city (i.e., location similarity) when they
respectively have values of aki and akj regarding ak. Specifically, we compute the total
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number of friend pairs where one user has a value of aki and the other has a value of akj ,
denoted as |{ak(u) = aki∧ak(v) = akj}|; Among these friend pairs, we further count the pairs
of friends who live in the same city, denoted as |{l(u) = l(v) ∧ ak(u) = aki ∧ ak(v) = akj}|.
Then,
Wk = {w
ij
k }M×M
= {p(l(u) = l(v)|ak(u) = aki ∧ ak(v) = akj )}M×M
= {
|{l(u) = l(v) ∧ ak(u) = aki ∧ ak(v) = akj}|
|{ak(u) = aki ∧ ak(v) = akj}|
}M×M
where M is the number of possible values of attribute ak including null.
For a certain attribute ak, assume that u and his LA-friend v have a value of aki and
akj respectively. Then, the u and v’s location similarity on ak can be easily obtained by
indexing the i-th row and j-th column of Wk, denoted as wk(u, v) = w
ij
k , v ∈ F
LA
(u).
We combine multiple location similarities on all the location sensitive attributes (e.g.,
work, hometown) with a set of trained parameters (β) to measure v’s weight. This combined
weight describes the probability that u and v live in the same city concerning all of their
location sensitive attributes.
Then, LA-FLI model calculates the probability of u living in li by integrating all the
weights of u’s LA-friends who live in li:
p
LA−F
(u, li) =
∑
v∈FLA (u)
∑
ak∈A
βkwk(u, v)pLA−U (v, li) (2)
where p
LA−U
(v, li) represents whether or not the LA-friend v living in li. It equals 1 if v
states his current city is li; otherwise, it is 0:
p
LA−U
(v, li) =


1 if l(v) = li
0 otherwise
5.2.2. LN-FLI Model
Before introducing LN-FLI model, we inspect the potential benefit of a user’s LN-friends
for his current city prediction with another example shown in Figure 2. We observe that
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u2, being a LN-friend of u1, does not expose his current city; whereas, the workplace of u2,
Telecom SudParis, indicates two cities — Paris and Evry — according to the current
cities of the users u3 and u4 who are also the employees of Telecom SudParis. Thereby,
a user’s LN-friends can also reveal some location indications in their exposed attributes,
which may help the prediction.
Therefore, for a LN-friend v, we first rely on his exposed location sensitive attributes
and use PLI model (Sec. 5.1) to predict his current city, as:
p
Prof
(v, li) =
∑
ak∈A,ak(v)6=null
αkp(l(v) = li|ak(v) = akj )
Treating all the LN-friends equally, LN-FLI model integrates LN-friends’ location indi-
cations and computes the probability that u lives in li ∈ L as:
p
LN−F
(u, li) =
∑
v∈FLN (u)
p
Prof
(v, li) (3)
5.2.3. FLI Model
Finally, primarily relying on LA-FLI model and being adjusted by LN-FLI model with
a small regulator parameter λ, FLI model estimates the probability that u currently lives
in li as:
p
F
(u, li) = pLA−F (u, li) + λpLN−F (u, li) (4)
5.3. Integrated Profile and Friend Location Indication Model
Next, we discuss how to integrate PLI model and FLI model into a unified probabilistic
location indication model, so as to capture the complete location indications. Specifically,
PFLI model calculates the probability of u living in li ∈ L as:
p(u, li) = θP pProf (u, li) + θF pF (u, li) (5)
Parameter Computation: To obtain a set of good parameters for the model, we first
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rewrite the model as:
p(u, li) =
∑
ak∈A
θ
P
αkσk(u, li)
+
∑
ak∈A
θ
F
βk
∑
v∈F
LA
(u)
wk(u, v)pLA−F (v, li)
+
∑
ak∈A
λθ
F
∑
v∈FLN (u)
αkσk(v, li)
=
∑
ak∈A
{[µkσk(u, li) + νkδk(u, li)] + [λααkηk(u, li)]}
(6)
where
• µk = θPαk; νk = θF βk; λα = λθF
• δk(u, li) =
∑
v∈FLA (u) wk(u, v)pLA−F (v, li)
• ηk(u, li) =
∑
v∈FLN (u) σk(v, li)
The location indications extracted from a user’s location sensitive attributes and his LA-
friends are considered as primary indications, while the location indication captured from
the LN-friends is only used to regulate the results. Therefore, we integrally train a good set
of parameters µk and νk; while we separately train αk.
To train the parameters µk and νk, we generate a training data set with items 〈label(li) :
features(u, li)〉, if the probability that a LA-user u lives in li is larger than zero, i.e.,∑
ak∈A
[σk(u, li) + δk(u, li)] > 0. In particular, li is labeled as a far location (label(li) = 0),
if the distance between li and u’s actual location is larger than a pre-defined threshold; oth-
erwise, it is labeled as a close location (label(li) = 1). Additionally, features(u, li) is a vector
consisting of σk(u, li) and δk(u, li), where k ∈ [1, m] represents the k-th location sensitive
attribute. Based on the generated items, we use a logistic regression method to train the
model in the following format:
f(y|x; σ1, · · · , σm, δ1, · · · , δm) = hσ,δ(x)
y(1− hσ,δ(x))
1−y
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where y is the label(li), x stands for the features(u, li) and hσ,δ(x) is the hypothesis function.
Then we can apply the gradient descent method to maximize f(y|x; σ, δ) and compute the
parameters. In the similar way, we can train a set of parameters αk.
6. Current City Prediction Approach
To address Challenge 2 of Sec. 1, we aggregate the close candidate locations into clusters
and devise a two-step current city selection approach. In this section, referring to Figure
1, we elaborate the Candidate Locations Cluster, Cluster Selector and Location Selector
respectively. We summarize the prediction approach at the end of this section.
6.1. Candidate Locations Cluster
We draw on the hierarchical clustering method, i.e., UPGMA (Unweighted Pair Group
Method with Arithmetic Mean) [34][18], to generate location clusters. This method arranges
all the candidate locations in a hierarchy with a treelike structure based on the distance
between two locations, and successively merges the closest locations into clusters. Algorithm
1 elaborates the clustering process.
Figure 3 illustrates an example of the clustering results on 154 candidate locations that
are located in the area with latitude in 47◦N ∼ 49◦N and longitude in 1◦W ∼ 6◦E. By using
the hierarchical clustering method, we divide these locations into 5 clusters. We note several
properties of our location clusters. First, instead of dividing areas with equal-sized grid
cells [25][9], the hierarchical clustering method only considers the user-generated locations
while the areas that no user mentions are out of consideration. Second, the densities inside
the clusters are different; however, the average distances between all the candidate locations
in any two neighboring clusters are equal (100km in Figure 3). Third, the complexity of the
algorithm is O(|L|3), where |L| is the total number of the candidate locations.
6.2. Cluster Selector
Given a location cluster and a LN-user’s location probability vector obtained by PFLI
model, we sum up the user’s probabilities of locations inside the cluster as the cluster
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ALGORITHM 1: Clustering Locations
Input: All the candidate locations l ∈ L;
Output: Location clusters set C = {c1, c2, · · · , cs} (s is the number of clusters);
Step 1 : treat all l ∈ L as a cluster and calculate the distance between any two locations;
repeat
Step 2 : find and merge the two closest location clusters into a new location cluster;
Step 3 : compute the average distance between the new cluster and each of the old ones;
until all the candidate locations are organized into one cluster tree;
Step 4 : cut the cluster tree into clusters with an ideal distance threshold
Figure 3: Example of Candidate Locations Cluster.
probability. Cluster selector calculates the probabilities of all the clusters that the LN-user
may reside in and then selects the cluster with the highest probability.
6.3. Location Selector
Finally, we select a best point from the selected cluster as the user’s predicted location
of the current city. Three alternatives are considered. First, we select the point of the
highest probability inside the selected cluster as the best point. Second, we consider the
geographic centroid of the selected cluster as the user’s best point. The geographic centroid
is the average coordinate for all the points in a cluster while the probability of each point is
considered as its weight. Third, we calculate the center of minimum distance which has the
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ALGORITHM 2: Current City Prediction
Input: A LN-user u’s location sensitive attributes;
u’s friends list and friends’ location sensitive attributes;
Location clusters set C = {c1, c2, · · · , cs} (s is the number of clusters);
Output: Predicted current city for u: 〈lat, lon〉;
Compute location indications p(u) by u’s location sensitive attributes and LN-friends (Eq. 7);
Obtain all of LA-friends’ current city L
LA−F
;
for li ∈ LLA−F do
p(u, li)← p(u, li) + pLA−F (u, li);
end
for cx ∈ C do
p(u)cx =
∑
l∈cx
p(u, l)
end
Cluster selection: ch where p(u)ch ≥ p(u)cx ,∀cx ∈ C;
Location selection from ch (Sec. 6.3);
The predicted current city of u: 〈lat, lon〉
minimum overall distance from itself to all the rest of locations in a cluster. We will further
discuss and compare the three methods in Sec. 7.
6.4. Implementation of Prediction Approach
We summarize the current city prediction approach in Algorithm 2. In practice, to speed
up the computation of location probability vector for a given LN-user u, we first compute
location indications from u’s location sensitive attributes and LN-friends:
p(u) =
∑
ak∈A
(µkR·ak(u) + λα
∑
v∈FLN
αkR·ak(v)) (7)
Assume L
LA−F
is the set of current cities of u’s LA-friends. We sum location indications
from u’s LA-friends p
LA−F
(u, li) (refer to Eq.2) to p(u, li), where li ∈ LLA−F .
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7. Evaluation on Current City Prediction
In this section, we first introduce the experiment setups including the used Facebook
data set, the compared approaches and the measurements. Then, we report the experiment
results.
7.1. Experiment Setup
7.1.1. Data description
We crawled Facebook by a Breadth First Search (BFS) [14] approach from March to
June in 2012 and collected 371, 913 users’ information including profile (e.g., gender, current
city, hometown) and friends. Among all these users, 153, 909 users publicly report their
current city (LA-users) and 225, 314 users do not reveal their current city (LN-users). All
these users generate 12, 863 different locations. For more details about this data set, please
refer to our previous work [17].
To evaluate the prediction approach, a user’s latest work or education experience is
extracted as a location sensitive attribute, named ‘Work and Education’; we also exploit
a user’s ‘Hometown’ as another location sensitive attribute. In our data set, 122, 899 LA-
users show ‘Hometown’, 54, 097 LA-users reveal ‘Work and Education’ and 115, 807 LA-users
publish their friend lists.
In addition to the exploited location sensitive information, some other information (e.g.,
a user’s geo-tagged posts) in Facebook may also leak the location. Our prediction approach
can be extended to consider other location sensitive information smoothly, which we will
discuss more in Sec. 9.1.
7.1.2. Approaches
We first compare the different location selection approaches introduced in Sec. 6.3 to
finalize the prediction approach with a good location selector. We also evaluate the per-
formance of non-cluster prediction approach to show the effectiveness of location cluster.
Specifically, these approaches can be denoted as:
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• PFLIprob is a cluster based approach which selects the point of highest probability from
the selected cluster as the predicted location.
• PFLIcent is a cluster based approach which selects the geographic centroid
1 from the
selected cluster as the predicted location.
• PFLIdist is a cluster based approach which selects the center of minimum distance
from the selected cluster as the predicted location.
• PFLInoclst is a non-cluster approach which selects the point of highest probability from
all candidate locations as the predicted location.
The proposed approaches are also compared to several state-of-the-art methods:
• Basedist predicts a user’s location based on the observation that the distance between
two users decreases by the increase of their friendship [3].
• Baseann maps any location sensitive attribute value to a certain location and applies
artificial neural network to train a current city prediction model [6].
• Basefreq, borrowing the idea from the prior works based on the Twitter data set [5][8],
counts the frequency of locations that emerge in a user’s friends and predicts his current
city by the most frequent location.
• Basefreq+ improves Basefreq by further using the neighborhood smoothing approach [8].
Given a location l, the points that are less than 20km apart from l are considered as
l’s neighborhoods.
• Baseknn also relies on the frequency idea for Twitter; however, it merely counts on a
user’s k closest friends who have the most common friends with him to compute the
most frequent location [1][2].
1Geographic centroid is the average coordinate for all the points in a cluster while the probability of each
point is considered as its weight.
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Basedist Baseann Basefreq Basefreq+ Baseknn PFLInoclst PFLIdist PFLIcent PFLIprob
AED@60% 8.6 5.7 5.9 4.9 10.8 2.5 49.5 5.6 2.1
AED@80% 85.0 64.3 91.8 56.0 100.0 40.1 77.4 38.0 36.9
AED@100% 1288.5 1129.0 1160.5 1123.7 1397.6 874.0 885.9 855.3 854.4
Table 1: Prediction Results (AED) for Users with LA-Friends
Among the above approaches, Basedist and Baseann are originally devised for Facebook;
while Basefreq, Basefreq+ and Baseknn are on Twitter. We utilize the main ideas from
Basefreq, Basefreq+ and Baseknn, and adopt them to fit our data set. By comparing our ap-
proach to Basedist, Basefreq, Basefreq+ and Baseknn which mainly depend on friendships, we
test the effectiveness of integrating location sensitive attributes. By comparing to Baseann,
we examine the newly introduced one-attribute/multiple-locations mapping method.
7.1.3. Measurement
Two widely used measurements: Average Error Distance (AED) and Accuracy within K
km (ACC@K ) [5][8][24] are exploited.
Error Distance computes the distance in kilometers between a user u’s real location
and predicted location, i.e., ErrDist(u). AED averages the Error Distances of the overall
evaluated users, denoted as AED =
∑
u∈U ErrDist(u)
|U |
. In addition, we rank the users by their
Error Distance in descending order and report AED of the top 60%, 80% and 100% of
the evaluated users in the ranked list, denoted as AED@60%, AED@80% and AED@100%
respectively [24].
Given a predefined Error Distance K km, a prediction for a user is considered as a correct
prediction, if the predicted Error Distance is less than K km; otherwise, the prediction is
incorrect. Then, Accuracy within K km is defined as the percentage of correct predictions
(i.e., the percentage of users being predicted with an Error Distance less than K km),
denoted as ACC@K = |{u|u∈U∧ErrDist(u)<K}|
|U |
. ACC@K shows the prediction capability of an
approach at a specific pre-established Error Distance.
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Basedist Baseann Basefreq Basefreq+ Baseknn PFLInoclst PFLIdist PFLIcent PFLIprob
AED@60% 102.8 6.7 73.9 66.6 119.5 3.5 50.6 6.3 3.1
AED@80% 1368.8 74.7 1257.2 1243.1 1429.6 52.5 88.2 50.2 49.1
AED@100% 2671 1204.0 2523.5 2498 2698.5 981.0 989.9 960.8 960.0
Table 2: Prediction Results (AED) for Overall Users
7.2. Experiment Results
Many relationship-based methods (e.g., Basedist, Basefreq, Basefreq+ and Baseknn) rely
heavily on users’ LA-friends whose locations are exposed. In general, such methods can
work well for the users who have a certain number of LA-friends; but when they are applied
to the overall users (who either have or do not have LA-friends), the performance notably
decreases. We evaluate the prediction performance on two user sets: users with LA-friends
and overall users, and report the evaluation results on AED and ACC@K subsequently.
7.2.1. Evaluation on AED
Table 1 and Table 2 show the AEDs of all the compared approaches for two user sets.
The smallest AEDs, which are generated by PFLIprob, have been highlighted in bold.
Let us first look at the PFLI model based approaches (i.e., PFLIdist, PFLIcent, PFLIprob,
and PFLInoclst). Among the first three cluster based approaches that are different at their
location selectors, PFLIdist generates the largest AEDs while PFLIprob achieves the smallest
AEDs. We also compare the non-cluster approach PFLInoclst and the cluster approach
PFLIprob, which both select location of the highest probability. We observe that PFLIprob
presents smaller AEDs than PFLInoclst and verify the effectiveness of the location cluster
approach.
In addition, the results show that the PFLI model based approaches present much smaller
AEDs than all the other baselines. In particular, the results demonstrate the PFLI model
based approaches mapping one-attribute to multiple locations reduce the AED significantly
compared to Baseann which maps one-attribute to one-location.
By examining the results of AED@60%, AED@80% and AED@100%, we observe that
the PFLI model based approaches can predict current city with relatively small AED@60%
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and AED@80%; whereas, AED@100% increases by 10–23 times from AED@80%. This
demonstrates the large Error Distance only occurs at predictions for a small number of
users.
Lastly, we compare the results in the two Tables and notice that the prior approaches
(Basedist, Basefreq, Basefreq+ and Baseknn) predict locations with much larger AEDs for
overall users than for users with LA-friends ; however, for the PFLI model based approaches,
AEDs differ slightly for two user sets. It demonstrates that a user’s profile can significantly
contribute to the location prediction when the user’s friends’ locations are unavailable.
7.2.2. Evaluation on ACC@K
We study ACC@K of the three proposed prediction approaches (PFLIprob, PFLIcent and
PFLIdist) for two user sets in Figure 4. We observe that the accuracy of PFLIprob goes
up steadily with the increase of Error Distance. PFLIcent may lead to very low accuracy
when the pre-established Error Distance is quite small; but it can achieve higher accuracy
than PFLIprob, when the pre-established Error Distance is larger than 40 km. This reveals
the properties of these two prediction approaches: PFLIcent, which selects the geographic
centroid of a cluster, generates a short average Error Distance to all the locations in the
cluster but fails to pick the user’s exact coordinate once it is not the centroid; while PFLIprob
may produce a large Error Distance if the location of the highest probability is not the user’s
real location. In addition, PFLIdist is not competitive with the other two approaches.
Rather than solely using any one of the proposed approaches, we exploit a combined-
approach strategy by flexibly selecting the best approach according to the pre-established
Error Distance. Specifically, this strategy uses PFLIprob when the pre-established Error
Distance is smaller than 40 km and otherwise applies PFLIcent. The combination is prac-
tical and can obtain a better performance than using any single approach. We plot the
combination line in Figure 4 and call it PFLIcmb.
Figure 5 compares PFLIcmb to various baseline methods in terms of ACC@K. We observe
that the proposed PFLIcmb outperforms all the compared baselines for both user sets. Com-
pared to PFLInoclst, PFLIcmb increases around 1.5% and 1.2% of accuracy on average for
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Figure 4: ACC@K of Different Location Selectors.
users with LA-friends and overall users. This proves the effectiveness of the cluster strategy
with successive cluster selection and location selection.
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Figure 5: ACC@K of the Proposed Approach and Other Baselines.
Comparing Figure 5(a) and 5(b), we observe that the approaches Basefreq, Basefreq+,
Basedist and Baseknn perform much worse for overall users than for users with LA-friends.
This observation again indicates that these approaches depend heavily on the friends’ loca-
tions. However, in respect of the other approaches, which integrate location indications from
both location sensitive attributes and friends (including our previous work Baseann [6]), the
prediction performance for overall users relatively approaches to the performance for users
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with LA-friends.
8. Current City Exposure Estimator
In this section, we pay attention to estimating current city exposure probability for a
user who hides his current city. We formulate the current city exposure estimation problem
as: Given, (i) a graph G = (U
LA
∪ U
LN
, E ,L); (ii) the public location l(u) for LA-users
u ∈ U
LA
; (iii) the location sensitive attributes A(u) and the friends list F(u) for all the
users u ∈ (U
LA
∪ U
LN
); (iv) a pre-established Error Distance K km, we forecast the current
city exposure probability within K km and report the exposure risk level for each LN-user
u ∈ U
LN
.
To solve this problem, we run the proposed prediction approach on an aggregation of
users and conduct analysis on the aggregated prediction results. Furthermore, we apply a
regression method to construct the exposure model according to the analysis observations.
Relying on this model, we devise a current city exposure estimator to inform users of their
current city Exposure Probability within K km and Exposure Risk Level.
The Exposure Probability within K km (EP@K) represents the probability that a user’s
current city could be inferred correctly if the pre-established Error Distance is K km. As it
is conceptually similar to the metric ACC@K, we compute it by the same formula:
EP@K =
|{u|u ∈ U ∧ ErrDist(u) < K}|
|U |
(8)
Additionally, we set up five Exposure Risk Levels according to the value of Exposure
Probability, shown in Table 3. Level 5 is defined as the most risky level, which indicates
an Exposure Probability higher than 0.9, while Level 1 is the safest one, which represents a
small Exposure Probability lower than 0.25.
Next, we show some observations of inspections on the aggregated prediction results. We
then introduce the current city exposure model and the model based estimator. Finally, we
illustrate some case studies to show the use of our proposed exposure estimator. We also
summarize some guidelines to reduce the exposure risk.
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Exposure Probability [0.9, 1] [0.75, 0.9) [0.5, 0.75) [0.5, 0.25) [0.25, 0]
Risk Level Level 5 Level 4 Level 3 Level 2 Level 1
Table 3: Risk Level vs. Exposure Probability
User’s Visible Attributes Abbreviation
‘Hometown’ ‘HT’
‘Work and Education’ ‘WE’
‘Friends’ ‘F’
‘Hometown’ and ‘Work and Education’ ‘HT+WE’
‘Hometown’ and ‘Friends’ ‘HT+F’
‘Work and Education’ and ‘Friends’ ‘WE+F’
‘Hometown’, ‘Work and Education’ and ‘Friends’ ‘HT+WE+F’
Table 4: Users Categories by Visible Attributes Combination
8.1. Current City Exposure Inspection
In this subsection, we extract several measurable characteristics from users’ self-exposed
information (e.g., User Category), and inspect the current city exposure probability by these
characteristics.
First, we classify users into diverse categories with respect to the combinations of visi-
ble/invisible properties of their location sensitive attributes and friends list. Table 4 lists the
obtained seven User Categories. User Category measures the types and amount of users’
self-exposed information.
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Figure 6: Current City Exposure Probability by User Category.
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Figure 6 inspects the Exposure Probabilities for various User Categories. From this figure,
we observe that different types of self-exposed information may divulge users’ current city
to different extent. For instance, users in ‘WE’ category are normally more dangerous to
disclose their current city than users in ‘HT’ or ‘F’ categories. We also find that the users
who publish their ‘WE’ (in ‘WE’, ‘HT+WE’, ‘WE+F’ or ‘HT+WE+F’ categories) exhibit
a high Exposure Probability. This means that ‘WE’ is a very risky attribute to leak users’
current city. The results also reveal that ‘HT’ is more sensitive to disclose current city than
‘F’, although ‘F’ is generally regarded as a significant location indication.
Figure 6 also indicates that a user’s current city generally could be predicted with a
higher probability if the user exposes more information. For example, users who expose
‘HT+F’ exhibit a higher exposure probability than users only revealing either ‘HT’ or ‘F’.
Note that, for a user who exposes ‘HT+WE’, his current city exposure probability can be up
to 90%, which approaches to the exposure probability of users who expose ‘HT+WE+F’. In
other words, merely exposing ‘HT+WE’ can almost lead to the exposure of a user’s current
city. To conclude, User Category, which distinguishes users by the types and amount of
their self-exposed information, relates to Exposure Probability.
In addition to User Category, we study the influence of the percentage of friends with at-
tributes (i.e., % Friends with Attributes) on Exposure Probability. % Friends with Attributes
is the ratio of a user’s friends who present at least one attribute to his overall friends.
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Figure 7 displays the Exposure Probability (i.e., EP, Z axis) by % Friends with Attributes
(i.e., FA, X axis) at different Error Distances (i.e., ED, Y axis). As more than 95% of the
users have a % Friends with Attributes smaller than 45%, we only look at its value in a range
of 0% to 45%. Generally speaking, Exposure Probability grows by the increase of % Friends
with Attributes.
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Figure 8: Exposure Probability by Cluster Confidence in Different User Categories.
In addition, we define a new metric named Cluster Confidence. It estimates the ratio of
the probabilities of candidate locations in the selected cluster ch to the overall probabilities
of all the candidate locations (equal 1), calculated as follows:
CC(u) =
∑
l∈ch
p(u, l)∑
l∈L p(u, l)
=
∑
l∈ch
p(u, l) (9)
Cluster Confidence represents the confidence of the users’ location indications. For exam-
ple, Cluster Confidence with a value of 100% means that all of a user’s location indications
point to an exclusive location cluster. We further look into the change of Exposure Probability
according to Cluster Confidence for each User Category.
Figure 8 reveals how Exposure Probability (i.e., EP, Z axis) varies with diverse Cluster
Confidence (i.e., CC, X axis) and Error Distances (i.e., ED, Y axis) in different User
30
Categories. The results show that the Exposure Probability normally grows up when the
Cluster Confidence gets larger. When the Cluster Confidence equals 100%, the Exposure
Probability surpasses 90% within a pre-established Error Distance of 20 km almost for all
User Categories. This observation indicates that the current city is more dangerous to be
predicted when a user’s location indications are more likely to point to one city or to multiple
cities that are in the same cluster. In other words, a user’s current city can be easily disclosed
if the confidence of the user’s self-exposed information is high.
Note that, there exists an exception for the users only exposing their ‘F’: the decline
of Exposure Probability when the Cluster Confidence is larger than 0.9. One reasonable
explanation is that only the users with an extremely small number of friends (e.g., only one
friend) can have the Cluster Confidence higher than 0.9, which might reduce the exposure
risk of current city due to the limited information.
8.2. Estimating Current City Exposure Risk
8.2.1. Current City Exposure Model
In the previous section, we observe that a user’s current city Exposure Probability is
probably influenced by four factors: Error Distance, User Category, % Friends with At-
tributes and Cluster Confidence. Taking these four factors as features, we respectively use
Random Decision Forest and Linear Regression approaches to model Exposure Probability.
The performance of model is evaluated by two commonly used metrics, Mean Absolute Error
(MAE) and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE), with 10-cross validation, shown in Table 5.
We observe that the Random Decision Forest based model outperforms the Linear Regres-
sion based model by presenting smaller MAE and RMSE. Therefore, we employ the Random
Decision Forest based model to estimate current city exposure probability, denoted as RDF
Exposure Model.
Furthermore, ‘Leave-one-feature-out’ approach is exploited to verify the effectiveness of
the features. We use Random Decision Forest approach to train exposure models by taking
out any one of the four features, namely No Error Distance, No User Category, No % Friends
with Attributes and No Cluster Confidence. Table 6 compares these ‘Leave-one-feature-out’
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Random Decision Forest Linear Regression
MAE 0.027 0.061
RMSE 0.077 0.146
Table 5: Performance Comparison of Exposure Models
RDF Exposure No Error No User No % Friends No Cluster
Model Distance Category with Attributes Confidence
MAE 0.027 0.052 0.065 0.045 0.082
RMSE 0.077 0.106 0.131 0.117 0.166
Table 6: Feature Verification of RDF Exposure Model
models to the RDF Exposure Model. We observe that the RDF Exposure Model presents the
best performance with the smallest MAE and RMSE. The performance degradations when
removing any one of the features just verify that all the four studied features contribute
to the model. Cluster Confidence is observed as the most sensitive feature for the model,
because the performance of the RDF Exposure Model drops most significantly when Cluster
Confidence is taken out.
8.2.2. Current City Exposure Estimator
By exploiting the proposed current city exposure model, we construct an exposure esti-
mator to forecast the exposure risk of a user’s private current city. Figure 9 illustrates the
framework of the current city exposure estimator. The exposure estimator contains three
main function modules: user information handler, current city exposure model and exposure
risk level decision. The inputs of the exposure estimator include a user’s self-exposed infor-
mation and a pre-established Error Distance. Given a user’s self-exposure information, the
user information handler determines User Category, and computes Cluster Confidence and
% Friends with Attributes. Based on the pre-established Error Distance, the obtained User
Category, Cluster Confidence, and % Friends with Attributes, the exposure model calculates
the current city exposure probability for the user. The exposure risk module determines a
risk level according to the exposure probability. Finally, the exposure estimator outputs two
risk measurements of current city: Exposure Probability and Risk Level.
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Figure 9: Framework of Current City Exposure Estimator.
8.3. Case Studies: Exposure Estimator and Privacy Protection
User
User Cluster Error % Friends with Exposure Risk
Category Confidence Distance Attribute Probability Level
U1 ‘HT+WE+F’ 0.69 100km 0.9% 0.967 Level 5
U1 ‘HT+WE+F’ 0.69 20km 0.9% 0.883 Level 4
U2 ‘F’ 0.208 100km 11.2% 0.564 Level 3
U3 ‘F’ 0.208 100km 0.2% 0.374 Level 2
U4 ‘WE+F’ 0.281 100km 2.1% 0.407 Level 2
U5 ‘WE+F’ 0.57 100km 2.1% 0.797 Level 4
U6 ‘HT+F’ 0.332 20km 20.1% 0.276 Level 2
U7 ‘HT+WE’ 0.73 100km 0% 0.903 Level 5
U8 ‘HT’ 0.169 20km 0% 0.059 Level 1
U9 ‘WE’ 0.404 20km 0% 0.834 Level 4
U10 ‘F’ 0.891 20km 17.2% 0.823 Level 4
Table 7: Exposure Estimator Cases Study
Any LN-users who reveal their self-exposed information and pre-define an Error Distance
can use the proposed current city exposure estimator to assess their Exposure Probability
and Risk Level. To better understand the use of exposure estimator, we illustrate several
use cases in Table 7. In this study, we observe that some of the LN-users are not really
safe to hide their current city if they leave some other information visible. For instance,
considering U9, even though only ‘WE’ is published, his current city is almost leaked with
an extremely high Exposure Probability of 0.834 within an Error Distance of 20 km. In
addition, for users in the same User Category, the one with a higher Cluster Confidence is
more likely to divulge his current city. Looking at U4 and U5 who are both in ‘WE+F’
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U1
Current status Hide
‘HT+WE+F’ ‘WE’ ‘F’ ‘HT’ ‘WE+F’ ‘HT+WE’
Exposure
0.967 0.503 0.944 0.936 0.456 0.073
Probability
Risk Level Level 5 Level 3 Level 5 Level 5 Level 2 Level 1
Table 8: Exposure Guidelines for U1: the exposure risks if he adjusts some privacy configurations
with an Error Distance of 100km
category, the current city of U5 who exhibits a higher Cluster Confidence is more dangerous
to be inferred, compared to U4’s current city.
In addition, the exposure estimator can offer some countermeasures on privacy configura-
tion against information leakage. Assume users hide some part of their exposed information,
the exposure estimator estimates and reports the corresponding Exposure Probability and
Exposure Risk Level. Then users can decide on a new privacy configuration accordingly. We
take U1 as an example and list some possible exposure risks assuming that he adjusts his
privacy configuration. The results shown in Table 8 reveal that the exposure risk could be
significantly decreased if U1 hides his ‘HT+WE’, ‘WE+F’ or ‘WE’. The results also point
out that merely hiding ‘F’ or ‘HT’ cannot protect U1’s current city privacy.
Finally, according to the studies on current city exposure risk, we summarize the following
general suggestions:
• As all the location indications may expose the hidden current city, close all of location
sensitive information including ‘WE’, ‘F’ and ‘HT’ so as to achieve a high current city
security.
• Hide the most sensitive exposed information (e.g., ‘WE’) if users want to publicly
share some personal information (e.g., ‘F’), since the most sensitive information can
independently lead to a quite high Exposure Probability. For example, ‘WE’ alone can
lead to an Exposure Probability higher than 80%.
• According to the centrality principle which refers to the Cluster Confidence, hide ‘F’ if
most friends indicate the same place where the user lives. For instance, U10 in Table
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7 is necessarily advised to hide his ‘F’.
9. Discussion and Future Work
In this section, we discuss some issues which are not addressed in this work due to space
limitations, and point out some future potential research directions.
9.1. Extensibility of the Current City Prediction Approach
Due to the data set limitation, we only use three features (i.e., ‘Hometown’, ‘Work and
Education’ and ‘Friend’) to evaluate our proposed current city prediction approach. How-
ever, our prediction approach can be extended to consider other location sensitive attributes.
For instance, for the location sensitive pages that a user follows (e.g., the page of a favorite
local restaurant) or the location sensitive posts that a user published (e.g., geo-tagged posts),
we can regard one page or one post as a LA-Friend and refer to LA-FLI model to explore
the location indications.
9.2. Adaptability of the Exposure Estimation Approach
In addition, our exposure estimation approach can easily adapt to other current city
prediction approaches by the two-step solution: (1) feature extraction (Sec. 8.1) and (2) ex-
posure model training (Sec. 8.2). In particular, we can first extract similar features for other
city prediction approaches as the inspected features in Sec. 8.1. Take Cluster Confidence as
an example. For the cluster-based city prediction approaches like ours, Cluster Confidence
can be extracted in the same way, i.e., the largest cluster prediction probability (Eq.9). For
the other city prediction approaches without a clustering step [3][24], following the essence of
Cluster Confidence, a similar feature, Prediction Confidence, can be computed as the largest
city prediction probability. Likewise, we can also obtain the other features presented in our
exposure model for many other city prediction approaches, while we do not discuss them
further for brevity. Once the features are derived, in the second step, we can directly apply
the regression methods used in Sec. 8.2 to train the exposure models for other prediction
approaches.
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9.3. Generalizability of the Exposure Estimator
Taking ‘current city’ as a representative attribute to study the information exposure issue,
this work gives further insights on how to assess the exposure risk of other privacy-sensitive
attributes (e.g., age). Denoting the privacy-sensitive attribute as PSA, the process to assess
its exposure risk can be generalized into three steps: 1) Explore PSA-sensitive attributes
and construct a PSA prediction model; 2) Inspect the prediction results to extract features
and train a PSA exposure model; 3) Based on the exposure model, implement an exposure
estimator to notify users of the exposure risk and provide suggestions to lower the risk if
necessary.
Moreover, our future work will consider integrating multiple exposure models into the
exposure estimator, so as to construct an exposure estimation system that can provide
reliable and multi-functional exposure risk estimations.
10. Conclusion
This paper starts with two open questions regarding the security of users’ hidden privacy-
sensitive attributes. To answer these questions, we first propose a novel current city pre-
diction approach to infer users’ current city by leveraging users’ self-exposed information
including location sensitive attributes and friends list. We validate the new prediction ap-
proach on a Facebook data set containing 371, 913 users, and the results reveal that the
users’ hidden current city may be dangerous to be predicted. Then we apply the proposed
prediction approach to predict users’ current city and model the exposure probability by
considering four measurable characteristics — Cluster Confidence, Error Distance, User
Category and Percentage of Friends with Attributes. Based on the exposure model, we pro-
pose a current city exposure estimator to measure the exposure probability and risk level
of users’ hidden current city according to their self-exposed information. The exposure
estimator can also help users to adjust their privacy configuration to satisfy their privacy
requirements. While this work studies the potential risk of users’ privacy-sensitive attributes
with a representative attribute of current city in Facebook, the proposed idea and approach
could be extended to other attributes and utilized by other OSNs.
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